Lusaka Agreement 1994

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In December 1994, General Lukamba Paulo Gato, UNITA`s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, told reporters that the Lusaka peace talks were under threat because of ambiguities over the amnesty and the government`s military actions against UNITA under the agreement. General Gato specifically mentioned that he considered the amnesty provision of the Lusaka Agreement to be ambiguous, that it granted a legal amnesty to all UNITA combatants. According to Gato, „The Lusaka Protocol did not provide for any amnesty. Instead, what he envisioned was national reconciliation or, in other words, mutual forgiveness. 3 The Lusaka Protocol, initialled in Lusaka, Zambia, on 31 October 1994, aimed to end the Angolan civil war by integrating and disarming UNITA and initiating national reconciliation. The two parties signed a ceasefire on 15 November 1994 under the Protocol, and the treaty was signed on 20 November 1994. [1] [2] Initialling of the Agreement by the Government of the Republic of Angola and UNITA on general and specific principles and procedures relating to the items on the agenda of the Lusaka II talks. Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and South African President Nelson Mandela met in Lusaka on 15 November 1994 in a symbolic step to increase support for the protocol. Mugabe and Mandela have both said they are ready to meet Savimbi; Mandela invited Savimbi to come to South Africa, but he did not leave for fear of being arrested for war crimes. [3] The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated the number of internally displaced persons for 1994 at 303,800. Portuguese television reported on 17 November 1994 that government troops and UNITA rebels were still fighting. UNITA claimed that after the ceasefire, the government attacked rebel positions throughout the country.

The claim was rejected by President dos Santos.2 In another government response, General Higino Carneiro added more ambiguity to the amnesty issue by suggesting that Savimbi`s refusal to limit the required number of UNITA troops agreed in the Lusaka agreement had been the problem. This indicated a catch-22 scenario. According to Savimbi, when UNITA troops were bombed by government forces, they did not yet have an amnesty. Savimbi said he must remain mobilized as long as the government pursues UNITA militarily. Meanwhile, General Higino said the violence was continuing because UNITA had not been demobilized in accordance with the plan. General Carneiro noted: „I believe that the recent statements of the UNITA leader may lead to different interpretations if we are not able to explain the steps of the Lusaka Protocol, including the imprisonment of soldiers. For example, we cannot understand the fact that UNITA cannot imprison more soldiers than it promised unless the government makes a gesture of goodwill. UnitA is thus distancing itself from the Lusaka Protocol. The two sides voluntarily signed an agreement in which they pledged to respect and implement the agreements.

That is our view. 3 The Lusaka Protocol called for comprehensive human rights monitoring, investigation of human rights violations and human rights education and training programmes. These programmes were not launched in 1994. The Lusaka Agreement called for a comprehensive sharing of local power in the form of civilian administrative quotas for UNITA. A total of 150 administrative bodies have been identified in the agreement. It was thought that the 4 governorships and 7 deputy governor positions would receive the most attention from the media and/or audit bodies. None of the 150 appointments in 1994 reported any changes. By the end of 1993, UNITA had been able to operate and plunder more than 70 per cent of Angola, but the government`s military successes in 1994 forced UNITA to seek peace.

By November 1994, the government had taken control of 60% of the country. UNITA CEO Jonas Savimbi called the situation „the deepest crisis“ for UNITA since its inception. Savimbi, who was unwilling to sign the agreement in person, had former UNITA Secretary-General Eugenio Manuvakola sign in his place, and President José Eduardo dos Santos responded by asking Angolan Foreign Minister Venancio de Moura to represent the MPLA. According to Manuvakola, Savimbi wanted him to act as a scapegoat. [1] [3] In 1994, administrative decentralization did not change. Not only did Unemployment fail to demobilize, but in 1996 and 1997 it purchased a large quantity of weapons from private sources in Albania and Bulgaria, as well as in Zaire, South Africa, the Republic of the Congo, Zambia, Togo and Burkina Faso. In October 1997, the United Nations imposed travel sanctions on UNITA leaders, but the United Nations waited until July 1998 to limit UNITA`s diamond exports and freeze UNITA`s bank accounts. While the U.S. government provided UNITA with $250 million between 1986 and 1991, UNITA earned $1.72 billion between 1994 and 1999 by exporting diamonds, mainly via Zaire to Europe. At the same time, the Angolan government has received large quantities of weapons from the governments of Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, the People`s Republic of China and South Africa.

Although no arms shipments to the Government have violated the Protocol, no country has informed the UNITED Nations Register of Conventional Arms as prescribed. [1] The agreement established a joint commission composed of officials from the Angolan government, UNITA and the United Nations and monitored by the governments of Portugal, the United States and Russia to monitor implementation. Infringements of the provisions of the Protocol would be examined and examined by the Commission. [1] The Lusaka Agreement called for political power-sharing as part of a reconciliation process. Certain specific modalities for the representation of Unita in the central government have been defined. First, the agreement provided for the readmission to the National Assembly of 70 UNITA deputies elected in the parliamentary elections of September 1992. Secondly, 17 posts in the central Government have been identified as vacancies to be filled by representatives of UNITA. None of these agreements were complied with in 1994. (3) If circumstances permit, the time limits of this timetable may be advanced by mutual agreement between the Government and UNITA. From November 1994 to 27 September 1996, UNITA sent 63,189 declared combatants to United Nations guard quarters to disarm and demobilize them. Many were civilians who had been told by UNITA that the camps were distributing food.

When UNAVEM forces asked them to dismantle a weapon, many were unable to do the job.5 Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA leaders signed a peace agreement in Lusaka in November 1994. Observers of the event immediately expressed skepticism to the press about holding the ceasefire.1 This was followed by working group meetings involving CiteS, Interpol and special agents from the US Fish & Wildlife Service, as well as lawyers from the Foundation for the Development of International Environmental Law (FIELD) at the University of London. The development of this African initiative a year later led to formal intergovernmental negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). This led to the adoption of the Lusaka Agreement on Cooperation Measures against Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora in Lusaka, Zambia, on 8 September 1994. The agreement is deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in New York, and is called United Nations Treaty (Environment) No. XXVII.11. 2.3 Make the final decision on possible violations. In case of violation of the agreements, take the necessary steps to establish the identification of the offender and make the final decision on the treatment of the above violations. .